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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
BAR ADMISSION COMMITTEES-
CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF
INQUIRY
In three recent decisions, the Supreme Court has narrow-
ed the scope of questions that may be legitimately asked of
prospective members of a State Bar Association regarding
their moral character, participation in certain esoteric or-
ganizations, and belief in a constitutional form of government.
In Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wad-
mond,1 the Court upheld New York's revised statutes and
rules governing the screening procedure for admitting pros-
pective lawyers 'to practice.2 Making a salient distinction,
the Court In re Stolar,3 concluded that the State of Ohio could
1 401 U.S. 154 (1971).
2 N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 90 (1) (a) (McKinney 1968), provides:
"Upon the state board of law examiners certifying that a
person has passed the required examination . . . the ap-
pellate division of the supreme court in the department to
which such person shall have been certified by the state
board of law examiners, if it shall be satisfied that such
person possesses the character and general fitness requisite
for an attorney and counselor-at-law, shall admit him to
practice . . . in all the courts of this state, provided that
he has in all respects complied with the rules of the court
of appeals and the rules of the appellate divisions relating
to the admission of attorneys." Section 528.1 states: "Every
applicant for admission to the bar must produce before a
committee on character and fitness appointed by an Ap-
pellate Division of the Supreme Court and file with such
Committee evidence that he possesses the good moral char-
acter and general fitness requisite for an attorney and
counselor-at-law as provided in Section 90 of the Judiciary
Law, which must be shown by the affidavits of two reputa-
ble persons residing in the city or county in which he re-
sides, one of whom must be a practicing attorney of the
Supreme Court of this State." N.Y. RULEs OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE ADmISSION OF ATToREYs Aim CouN-
SELORS-AT-LAw §528.1 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
3 401 U.S. 23 (1971).
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not deny admission to practice law based upon the applicant's
refusal to answer certain questions about his beliefs and as-
sociations. Likewise, in Baird v. State Bar of Arizona,4 the
Court sustained the applicant's contention that his beliefs
and views were immune from bar examination inquiry. The
primary basis of decision in each of these cases was that the
system of screening and questioning utilized, violated the ap-
plicant's rights of free speech and association as protected by
the first amendment.
It has been a long established tradition that the judiciary
has complete supervision and control over the legal profes-
sion.5 To effectuate this practice, it became necessary for the
local bar associations of the various states to assume the re-
sponsibilities for screening applicants to practice law.6 Tradi-
tionally, these admission requirements have been as austere
or benign as the state desired.7
An example of an early requirement occured during the
post-Civil War era when efforts were made to prevent cer-
tain supporters of the Confederacy from practicing law in
the federal courts without first taking a loyalty oath to the
effect that the applicant had never sympathized with the
South, and had always been loyal to the United States.8 In
Ex parte Garland,9 the Supreme Court held such oaths un-
constitutional as being an ex post facto law which imposed
a new punishment for a person's prior legal acts, and as a
bill of attainder due to the imposition of a penalty without
having had a trial. It appears, however, that this case has
been an exception to the general practice of the Supreme
Court. In most situations, the Court has been most reluctant
4 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
5 E.g., Ex Parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 168 (1824).
6 See Comment, 15 STAN. L. REv. 500 (1963).
7 See Note, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 753, 755 (1958).
8 See, e.g., Act of Jan. 24, 1865, ch. 20, 13 Stat. 424; Act of
July 2, 1862, ch. 128, 12 Stat. 502.
0 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
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to reverse determinations made by the various states regard-
ing an applicant's character and fitness to practice law. For
example, in Bradwell v. State, 0 the Court upheld the right
of the Illinois State Bar to deny a woman applicant admittance.
The Court stated that it was the State's right to elucidate the
qualifications required of prospective members of the State
Bar, and these qualifications are not within the ambit of the
fourteenth amendment. Likewise, the Supreme Court In re
Lockwood" sustained the Virginia Bar in excluding a woman
from membership, by stating that it was the right of the Vir-
ginia Courts to construe the meaning of the word "person"
in the state statute prescribing admission to the bar.
Modern restrictions on lawyers and prospective lawyers
were initiated at the close of World War II. The first in a
series of such cases was In re Summers, 2 which held that
admission to a state bar could be refused solely on the ground
that the applicant, as a conscientious objector, could not in
good faith take the required oath to support and defend the
state constitution; and, as a result of his denial, the state did
not violate the applicant's first amendment right to freedom
of religion. "The responsibility for choice as to the personnel
of its bar rests with Illinois.' 3 During the subsequent Cold
War era, many fears were expressed concerning the unique
opportunity that existed for the Communist Party to infiltrate
1o 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
" 154 U.S. 116 (1894).
12 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
'8 Id. at 570. The authority of Summers has been somewhat
weakened by the Court's subsequent decision in Girouard
v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). (Alien unwilling to
bear arms in military service may be admitted to citizen-
ship). Summers relied heavily upon the decisions in United
States v. Schwimmer, 297 U.S. 644 (1927), and United States
v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931), both of which were over-
ruled by Girouard.
[Vol. 8, No. 1
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the legal profession. 4 As a result, a variety of security and
loyalty oath cases besieged the courts.15 The first significant
cases of this nature regarding t h e legal profession were
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners6 and Konigsberg v. State
Bar (Konigsberg I)17. In Schware, the New Mexico Board of
Bar Examiners denied admission to the applicant on three
grounds: (1) the use of certain aliases to procure employ-
ment and prevent anti-semitism reaction; (2) the applicant
having been arrested in a labor dispute with no subsequent
conviction or indictment; and (3) for eight years, the appli-
cant had been a member of the Communist Party. All of these
activities had occured some twenty years before the decision
(from 1932 to 1940). Some of the "plus factors" of the appli-
cant's character had been his service in the armed forces as
a paratrooper; his operating a successful business while in
law school to support his wife and two children; and his good
character references from four students, teachers, and as-
sociates. The Supreme Court reversed in favor of the appli-
cant, holding the state had deprived the petitioner of due
process by denying him admission without sufficient evi-
dence. Justice Black, concluding for t h e Court, stated:
"There is no evidence in the record which rationally justifies
a finding that Schware was morally unfit to practice law."'
18
'14 See Note, Inquiries Into the Political Beliefs and Activities
of Applicants for Admission to the Bar, 1 COLUM. SURVEY
OF HUmAN RIGHTS L. 33 (1968).
'5 See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (com-
pulsory disclosure of N.A.A.C.P. membership under the pre-
text of a city tax ordinance, ruled as unconstitutional);
Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956)
(a teacher claimed the fifth amendment in an investiga-
tion, and dismissal resulted; Court held dismissal invalid.
The Court concluded that since the questions were unrelated
to a legitimate state interest, a person's refusal to answer
could not be used to penalize him for his non-cooperation).
16 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
17 353 U.S. at 246.
1 353 U.S. at 246.
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The decisions in Summers and Schware had dealt with the
issue whether a personal or moral characteristic was justifiable
grounds of denial of admission to the state bar. In Konigsberg
1,19 a different issue was presented to the Court for decision,
whether an applicant can be denied admission to the state
bar solely because of his refusal to answer a relevant ques-
tion. Konigsberg was denied admission to practice law in Cali-
fornia not only for his refusal to answer certain questions
concerning Communist affiliations, but also because of cer-
tain previous activities which had cast doubt about his belief
in and adherence to a constitutional form of government, and
his moral character. The California Supreme Court denied
Konigsberg's petition for review20 and the Supreme Court re-
versed. The majority, speaking through Justice Black, refused
to reverse solely on the constitutional issue of the applicant's
right to refuse to answer pertinent questions. The majority
concluded that, as in Schware, upon an examination of the
entire record, including his refusal to answer, there existed
evidence to rationally support the state bar's decision.21 On
remand of the case, the state bar association conducted further
investigations during which the applicant submitted evidence
of his good moral character to abate the claims of his militant
attitude toward the government. However, Konigsberg again
refused to answer specific questions concerning his member-
ship in the Communist Party. On the grounds that his refusal
to answer obstructed the full and fair inquiry into the ap-
plicant's qualifications, the state bar association again reject-
ed his application and the State Supreme Court again denied
Konigsberg's petition for review.22 In affirming, the Supreme
19 353 U.S. 252 (1957). For a case summary of the denial of
medical or legal professional license as violating due process
see Annot., 6 L. Ed. 2d. 1328 (1957).
20 353 U.S. at 254.
21 353 U.S. at 262.
52 Cal.2d at 722, 344 P.2d at 779, 780 (1959). Konigsberg
reiterated his disbelief in a violent overthrow of the govern-
ment, and denied any membership in such a group that
adheres to such a policy.
[Vol. 8, No. i
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Court (Konigsberg II) based it's decision upon "an appro-
priate weighing of the respective interests involve." 23 The
Court found the state's interest in not admitting an applicant
whose political views were somewhat doubtful outweighed
the applicant's right to free speech.24 The majority of the
Court rejected the contention that freedom of speech and as-
sociation as espoused in the first and fourteenth amendments
are absolute. Justice Harlan, speaking for the majority, stated:
[I]t is difficult, indeed, to imagine a view of the con-
stitutional protections of speech and association which
would automatically and without consideration of the
extent of the deterrence of speech and association and
of the importance of the state function, exclude all
reference to prior speech or association on such issue
as character, purpose, credibility, or intent.25
In re Anastaplo,26 decided the same day as Konigsberg II,
presented in a more precise context, the result of an applicant
refusing to answer a relevant question asked him by a bar
examination committee. Anastaplo refused to answer ques-
tions concerning his membership in the Communist Party on
the grounds that his affiliation with that group was not rea-
sonably related to the bar association's function of determin-
ing moral character of the applicant. In addition, he claim-
ed it violated his first amendment right of association. On the
single ground of obstruction, the committee refused certifica-
tion, and Anastaplo charged the committee's reasoning as be-
ing a pretext for personal animosity.2 7
2 366 U.S. 36, 56 (1961). See Cranton, The Supreme Court and
State Power to Deal with Subversion and Loyalty, 43 MiN-.
L. REv. 1025, 1065-68 (1959).
24 See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (Court
upheld sentence imposed on a professor for his refusal to
answer certain questions asked him by a legislative com-
mittee in investigating communist activity in the state).
2S 366 U.S. at 51 (1961).
26 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
27 See Kalven & Steffen, The Bar Admission Cases: An Un-
finished Debate, 21 LAw 3N TANsImToN 155, 186 (1961).
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A majority of the C o u r t considered the claims of
Anastaplo precluded by the decision in Konigsberg II, but
restated:
[T]he State's interest in enforcing such a rule as ap-
plied to refusals to answer questions about member-
ship in the Communist Party outweighs any deterrent
effect upon freedom of speech and association .... 28
A celebrated state court decision to apply certain guide-
lines of the Supreme Court is Hallinan v. Committee of Bar
Examiners2 9 The bar examining committee had denied ad-
mission to the applicant based upon his past history of mis-
demeanor convictions obtained during civil rights demonstra-
tions. To the bar examiners, this conduct showed a disrespect
for the judicial process and the law.30 The California Supreme
Court reasoned, inter alia, that since a substantial number
of legal scholars, professional practitioners, and eminent citi-
zens supported and shared the applicant's belief, that this was
not evidence that the applicant lacked good moral character. 1
There have been a multitude of related cases concerning
areas of employment other than the legal profession.8 2 For
example, there has been significant litigation on restrictions
of public employees, 33 public office holders,3 4 and aliens.8
The current approach toward first amendment issues is the
controversial "balancing test."36 The older "clear and present
28 366 U.S. at 88.
" 65 Cal.2d 447, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 421 P.2d 76 (1966).
30 65 Cal.2d at 450, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 231, 421 P.2d at 79; see
Note, Bar Admissions-The Character Investigation as an
Unconstitutional Scheme to Promote Conformity, 23 VA'D.
L. REV. 131, 135 (1969).
31 65 Cal.2d at 460, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 238, 421 P.2d at 86.
32 E.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (an individual
has a right to engage in any "common" occupation).
33 E.g., Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
34 E.g., Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 341 U.S.
56 (1951).
31 E.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
36 Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
[Vol. 8, No. I
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danger test" has generally been considered abandoned by the
Court in the area of first amendment rights due to its "diffi-
cult" application.37 Under the balancing test, the first amend-
ment purports to protect "interests" rather than "rights."
These protected interests are those of state action versus in-
dividual affairs. The higher the virtues of state action are,
the more intrusions on private interests may be made with-
out being considered arbitrary or capricious.3 8 This theory
was developed by the Supreme Court during the Cold War era
of the 1950's when the courts were besieged by loyalty oath
cases.
An important development in the first amendment area
occured in N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.9 In that
case, the Supreme Court made it clear that the right of free
association was. a protected first amendment right. The State
of Alabama ordered the state N.A.A.C.P. chapter to disclose the
names and addresses of all its members in Alabama to deter-
mine whether that organization was in violation of the foreign
corporation law. The Court said the need for the records had
no substantial bearing upon whether the N.A.A.C.P. had vio-
lated the state's foreign corporation law, and therefore, there
was no legitimate state interest sufficient to outweigh the
individual rights of free association.40 More substantial re-
iteration came in United States v. Robel,41 when the Supreme
Court dispelled all doubts about whether free association was
a fully protected first amendment right. In Robel, the Court
held that a provision of the Subversive Activities Control Act
that prohibited a Communist from working in certain defense
plants was invalid as it rendered one guilty by association,
without a determination that an individual's belief was in
37 E.g., N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449
(1958).
38 E.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
39 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
40 Id. at 464.
41 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
1972]
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fact violent or militant.4 2 In Elfrandt v. Russe, 43 members of
an organization were prevented from working at certain jobs
due to association in a "subversive" organization. As a result,
the Supreme Court concluded that the statute infringed upon
the petitioners' freedom of association.
In the area of tax exemptions, the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a California statute which required each ap-
plicant, as a prerequisite to obtaining tax exemption on vet-
erans' property, to subscribe to a loyalty oath.44
Loyalty oaths for teachers have been struck down by the
Court as unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.45 Likewise,
the Court has invalidated loyalty oaths as a condition of em-
ployment for state employees as being void for vagueness in
many analogous cases.46
In Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v.
Wadmond,47 the appellants were contending: (1) That the
screening system used by the Committee on Character and
Fitness was void for vagueness and overbreadth, (2) that
this system, by its very existence, worked a chilling effect
upon the exercise of free speech and association of prospec-
tive applicants of the New York Bar.43
The procedure used by the appellants in the trial court
was the commencement of two separate suits in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
42 389 U.S. at 265. Therefore, as the Act included mere mem-
bership, it was unconstitutional.
48 384 U.S. 11 (1966); accord, Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S.
131 (1966).
44 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
5 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); see Comment, Judi-
cial Rewriting of Overbroad Statutes: Protecting the Free-
dom of Association from Scales to Robei, 57 CAwF. L. REv.
240 (1969); Note, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 549 (1967); Comment,
Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).,
46 E.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
47 401 U.S. 154 (1971).
48 N.Y. Cw. PRAc. LAW R. 9401 et. seq. (McKinney 1963).
[Vol. 8, No. I
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seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against two Com-
mittees on Character and Fitness. A three-judge court was
convened and consolidated the actions into one suit.49
The Supreme Court ruled at the outset that the character
and general fitness requirements of applicants for admission
to the New York Bar were not unconstitutional. 0 The Court
noted the long standing usage of the requirement that the ap-
pellants found objectionable, and reiterated that such char-
acter inquiries concerning previous conduct that were rele-
vant to the legal profession were still valid.51
The appellees maintained that part of the procedure which
required an applicant to furnish proof of his belief in and
loyalty to the form of government of the United States, as
not placing a burden of proof on the applicant, and that the
"form of government" in question refers only to the Con-
stitution. Also, "belief" and "loyalty" only mean that an ap-
plicant be willing to take the oath with the ability to do so
in good faith. Based upon this construction of the rule, the
Court found no constitutional violation, and no intention to
"penalize political beliefs."52
As to the issue of the constitutionality of the questions
asked concerning organizational membership, the Court said
the questions contained the necessary limitations to prevent
them from being unconstitutional.
"We have held that knowing membership in an organiza-
tion advocating the overthrow of the Government by force or
violence, on the part of one sharing the specific intent to fur-
ther the organization's illegal goals, may be made criminally
punishable."' ' Further, the Court stated: "It is also well set-
49 The suits were commenced under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3)
(1964) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
=0 401 U.S. at 159.
51 Id. at 160; see Knight v. Board of Regents, 269 F. Supp. 339,
affd per curiam, 390 U.S. 36 (1968).
52 401 U.S. at 163.
5 Id. at 165.
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tled that Bar examiners may ask about Communist affiliations
as a preliminary to further inquiry into the nature of the
association and may exclude an applicant for refusal to an-
swer."15 4
The "chilling effect" complaint alleged by the appellants
was considered groundless by the Court due to New York's
scrupulous and careful administration of the screening process.
The Court held that so long as the screening procedure used
by the committee shows a willingness to keep the process
within the safeguards of the Constitution, the procedure will
be, upheld. 55
The dissenting opinion in Wadmond by Justice Marshall,
was echoed in the majority holding In re Stolar,5 6 a n d
Baird v. State Bar of Arizona.57 In StoZar, the appellant had
previously been admitted to practice law in New York, and
in his initial application, had answered questions present-
ed him by the New York Bar. When the appellant applied
to the Ohio Bar for admission to practice, he again answered
certain questions concerning his moral character and fitness
to practice law. Stolar did not however answer some ques-
tions posed on the bar application, contending that they in-
fringed upon his first and fifth amendment rights. 8
Initially, the Supreme Court found the question asking
for the applicant to list all organizations to which he has be-
longed since the age of 16 violative of the petitioner's first
amendment rights. The Court sounded the reasoning of Shel-
ton v. Tucker59 that such a question infringed upon the ap-
plicant's freedom of association due to its effect of stifling
his membership in an organization that might be considered
offensive by those who control his "professional destiny."
54 Id.
5 Id. at 167.
56 401 U.S. 23 (1971).
57 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
58 401 U.S. at 27.
'59 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
[Vol. 8, No. I
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Expanding the reasoning of Shelton the Court stated: "law
students who know they must survive this screening process
before practicing their profession are encouraged to protect
their future by shunning unpopular or controversial organiza-
tions."60
Due to the fact that Stolar had previously been a mem-
ber in good standing of the New York Bar, and had supplied
the Ohio Committee with extensive information concerning
his personal and professional character, the Court concluded
that questions of his past organizational associations would
not aid Ohio in determining whether Stolar had the required
qualifications necessary to practice law.
In conclusion, the Court stated the principle that:
.. Ohio may not require an applicant for admis-
sion to the Bar to state whether he has been or is a
"member of any organization which advocates the
overthrow of the government of the United States by
force." As we noted above, the first amendment pro-
hibits Ohio from penalizing a man solely because he
is a member of a particular organization. . . . Since
this is true, we can see no legitimate state interest
which is served by a question which sweeps so broad-
ly into areas of belief and association protected against
government invasion.61
In Baird v. State Bar of Arizona,62 as in Stolar, the ap-
plicant was asked to list all organizations that she had been
associated with since she was 16 years of age. However, the
Arizona Bar Committee also solicited a response as to whether
or not she had ever been a member of the Communist Party,
or any similiar organization that advocated the violent over-
throw of the government. The applicant answered the first
question to the committee's satisfaction. As to the second
question, Baird refused to answer, and for this reason, she
was denied admission to the state bar.
60 401 U.S. at 28.
61 Id. at 30.
62 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
1972]
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The Court first stated that for the protection of the free-
dom of association, a state could not exclude a person from
a profession solely due to membership in a political organiza-
tion, or for holding certain beliefs. This area is protected from
unbridled state inquiry by the first amendment. The Court
stated: ". . . it is sufficient to say we hold that views and be-
liefs are immune from bar association inquisitions designed
to lay a foundation for barring an applicant from the practice
of law ... [T]he practice of law is not a matter of grace,
but of right for one who is qualified by his learning and his
moral character."'
Relating the holdings in these cases to the present Okla-
homa Bar application, it appears some of the questions asked
are violative of the Supreme Court's rulings. Under the head-
ing of "moral character," question 13(a) on the applicant's
questionnaire would appear to be in direct conflict with the
holdings in Baird and Stolar. This question asks: "Are you
now, or have you ever been a member of or affiliated with
the communist party, U.S.A., or any communist organiza-
tion?" 64 This question could have the effect of denying an
applicant membership into the Oklahoma Bar solely because
of his affiliation with this particular organization, or just be-
cause he holds certain political beliefs that are contrary to
those of the bar examiners. Question 13(b), asks if the ap-
plicant has ever belonged to an organization "which has adopt-
ed, or shown a policy of advocating or approving the com-
mission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons
their rights, under the Constitution of the United States, or
which seek to alter the form of government of the United
States by unconstitutional means?"6 5 This question not only
does not include the necessary element of belief and partici-
3 Id. at 8.
6 BoARD OF BAR Ex~wSnm s OF THE OLAHomA BAn Asso-
cIATiON, Form No. 4, Applicant's Questionnaire and Affida-
vit, Question 13 (a) (Hereinafter cited as Form No. 4).
65 Id., question 13(b).
[VoI. 8, No. I
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pation in such an organization on the part of the applicant,
but also is vague as to what "unconstitutional means" covers.
Although question 13 (d) which deals in participation in "dem-
onstrations, sit-ins, etc."166 was not specifically considered by
the Supreme Court, it would appear that the effects of such a
question are clearly within the ambit of the three recent cases
discussed. First, this question creates a "chilling effect" on
the exercise of an individual's constitutional rights of free
speech and free association. If law students knew that they
must answer such a question on the bar application, then they
would be "encouraged to protect their future by shunning un-
popular or controversial organizations." 67 Secondly, what is
meant by "demonstrations," "sit-ins," or "etc.?" Are only con-
troversial or unpopular actions to be considered? This again
demonstrates the vagueness upon which such a question rests.
The elements of question 14 were discussed by the Su-
preme Court, and as it is stated on the applicant's question-
naire for admission to the Oklahoma Bar, is unconstitutional:
"List below the names, addresses, objects of and period of
membership in each and every club, association, society or or-
ganization of which you are or have been a member."6 s This
question is not even limited as to a recent number of years, but
includes all such memberships since the applicant was born.
In this writer's opinion, the Oklahoma Bar application
should be revised and corrected to conform to the mandate
of the Supreme Court set forth in the three cases discussed
above.
Although it appears that employment of the nebulous
term "good moral character" as a standard for determining
the worthiness of an applicant for admission to the bar has
not been significantly weakened, there still remain more
constructive and practical methods of reaching the same de-
16 Id., question 13 (d).
67 In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 28 (1971).
68 Form No. 4, question 14.
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sirable goal. Because of the large number of applicants par-
ticipating in certain organizations which voice their concern
over the governmental endeavors, bar examiners have prob-
ably never faced a more difficult time in determining whether
an applicant has the necessary respect for and belief in a
constitutional form of government. There have been many
moral questions and objections to the existing laws and the
procedure used in enforcing them. But, how far can a pros-
pective member of a state bar association go in voicing his
opinion as to these problems? What if his conduct in exercis-
ing his right to free speech shows some "disrespect" toward
the existing establishment? It is this grey area in which bar
examiners must function, and as most agree, a better system
would be most advantageous.00
Some authors suggest a more satisfying and enduring
method of considering the moral character problem; start the
investigation procedure earlier in the student's legal career 70
A procedure developed along this concept would enable a stu-
dent to know for certain that upon his graduation he would
be acceptable to the state bar. If a student's previous conduct
was questionable, then before his time and financial resources
were wasted, he would know for a fact whether he would be
admitted. This process could even be accomplished before a
student entered law school, as for example during his senior
year of undergraduate school. Proof of good moral character
could be required before admission to law school, with the
condition that acceptance to law school would constitute ac-
ceptance to the state bar association.
Some commentators have suggested that the standard of
69 See Bard & Bamford, The Bar: Professional Association or
Medieval Guild, 19 CATHOLIC U. L. REv. 393 (1970).
70 Kanner, Dual Character Investigation: At Time of Law
School Registration and Prior to Admission to the Bar, 30
BAR ExAuwER 60 (1961); See THm NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
BAR ExAmmgms, Tim BAR EXAM=NR HANDBoOK 48-107
(1968).
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"good moral character" be changed to one of "dishonorable
conduct relevant to the occupation."'7 1 Under this standard,
only certain types of unlawful conduct would prevent an ap-
plicant from being admitted to practice. In addition, it would
be much easier to administer, without the built-in limitations
and subjective bias of the older procedure.
A more practical approach to the problem, viewed in light
of the Supreme Court's holdings in Wadmond, Stolar, and
Baird, would be a four-fold method: (1) That there is a pre-
sumption that the applicant is loyal to the constitutional form
of government, and is admissible to practice in the state, (2)
if the applicant gives no indication of certain beliefs or illegal
conduct, then the examining committee has the burden of
proving the applicant is unfit to practice, (3) the applicant
should not be compelled to answer questions pertaining to
his first amendment rights unless the examining committee
has sustained its burden of proof, (4) the examining commit-
tee must divulge to the applicant all of its information relied
upon in making its determination.7 2
Due to the highly competitive status of available posi-
tions in entering classes of law schools, it is the opinion of
this writer that if a student is acceptable to an acredited law
school, based upon a showing of good moral character, he
should likewise be acceptable to the state bar association,
with a subsequent limited inquiry upon graduation being con-
ducted.
It has now become necessary for bar examiners to realize
that not everyone will think as they do-that political activists
have the same rights as non-activists, and are protected by
the same Constitution. That so long as their political views
71 See generally Selinger & Schoen, To Purify the Bar; A
Constitutional Approach to Non-Professional Misconduct, 5
NATURAL RESOURCES J. 299 (1965).
7.2 See Brown & Fassett, Loyalty Tests for Admission to the
Bar, 20 U. Cmi. L. Rav. 480 (1953).
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